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Employers' Use of Lockouts under the Employment 
Contracts Act 1991: A New Balan~ce of Power? 
Rebecca Ma~cfie* 
Since May 1991 lockouts have become a more familiar featu~e of New Zealand's 
industrial re,lations environment, and have been used to powerful effect by employers on a 
number of well-publicised occasions. l.t has been argued that the Employment Contracts Act 
is not responsible for this development. This arg,wnent rests primarily on the fact that the 
ECA 's lockout provisions were inher,ited from the Labour Relations Act. This paper examines 
the case law on lockouts under the ECA, and argues that the bargaining environment created 
by the ECA has made the lockout a more powerful, and the~efore more attractive, weapon 
than was the case under the LRA. 
Since the 1987 Labour Relations Act, Parliament has recognised the right of workers 
to strike and employers to lock out, free of the tmeat of civil action, in certain closely defined 
circumstances. These tools of industrial bargaining are, in theory, equal and counterbalancing, 
giving employers and employees limited right to bring coercive pressure to bear on the 
opposite party. 
As Colgan J commented in NZ Public Service . Association v Design power NZ Ltd 
16/4/92 WEC 17N92: 
It is .. . noteworthy that the power to lawfully lockout employees is o~ten said 'lO be the 
mirror image of and quid pro quo of dte right or power of employees to str&e to the same 
end 
Since the enactment of the Employment ~Contracts A~ct (ECA), lockouts have become 
a much more prominent feature of New Zealand's industrial relations landscape, and a 
considerably more popular element of ~employers' industrial relations armoury. It will be 
argued here that this trend is a product of the ECA' s deregulated and decentralised bargaining 
framework, which, combined with the definition of lockout inherited from the Labour 
Relations Act (LRA), has led to a body of case law establishing the lockout, and in particular 
the so-called "partial lockout" whereby selected portions of employees' contracts are breached, 
as an ~extremely powerful tool in employers' hands. As a consequenc,e, the tenet of industrial 
law espoused by Colgan J in Designoower and quoted above :no longer reflects the reality of 
industrial relations, and the balance of power has swung funily in favour of employers. 
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The role of lockouts prior to the ECA 
Despit~e New Zealand's industrial relations climate being marred by conflict, 
particularly in the 1960s and 1970s (Brosnan et aL, 1990), employers were generally loathe 
to use the lockout tool. Hughes (1990) noted that lockouts had historically been of Jittle 
significance in New Zealand labour law, and that this had been explained on the basis that 
employers were restrained from using the lockout weapon by the obligation, until 1981, to 
pay wages to locked out workers, or because of ~employers' concern for their workers' 
welfare. A more significant reason for the relative dearth of case law on lockouts, argued 
Hughes, was the restrictive definition of lockout which comprised both the employers' action 
and its motive, and the consequent difficulty of proving a lockout had occurred. 
Such case law as did develop prior to the ECA did, however, hint at the unrealised 
power of the lockout weapon. The notion that a lockout could be something other than a 
literal locking of the factory gates was well established under the LRA. In NZ Dairy Food 
and Texti.le Workers, Union v Cavalier B~emworth Ltd [1991] 2ERNZ (WLC32), the union 
successfully alleged the employer's action in imposing a new shift system on workers was 
a lockout In NZ Seamens, JUOW & Federated Cooks and Stewards' Union .etc v Shipping 
Corporation of .New Zealand [1989] 1 NZll.,R 6, the idea that a mass dismissal could 
constitute a lockout was recognised. The Public Service Association, in NZ Pub.lic Service 
Association v Armourguard Rescue Services Ltd [1989] 3 NZII~R 343, recognised by 
implication the conoept of the "partial lockout" by arguing (unsuccessfully) that the 
introduction of a new rescue frre appliance befo~e the customary consultativ·e discussions on 
manning had been held was a lockout. Similarly, in NZ Ai~l.ine Pilots, Association v Air New 
Zealand [1991] 2 ERNZ (AEC35), the plaintiff union argued (again, unsuccessfully) that the 
airline's requirement that pilots be clean-shaven was a lockout. It is noteworthy that in ~each 
of these cases the employer argued its action was not a lockou~ including in the Shipping 
Corporation case where the lockout was held to be lawful. In contras~ in the leading cases 
on lockouts under the ECA the employer has expressly ensured its actions fell within the 
definition of lockout. This points to a new consciousness among employers of the potency 
of the lockout which was absent prior to the 1991 Act. 
It is arguable that in the climate of high inflation that prevailed in the 1970s and 1980s 
employers did not need to resort to lockouts to achieve their aims. For example, in the 1989 
and 1990 wage rounds under the LRA, wage settlements were markedly below the rate of 
inflation . The 1989 wage round followed a 4.5% path, while inflation for the December 1989 
quaner ·was 7.2%, and in 1990 the Council of Trade Unions-Labour Government "growth 
agreement .. kept most workers in the collective bargaining system to a 2% pay rise, while 
inflation for the .December quarter that year ran at 4.8%. Analysis by Harbridge of the five 
wage rounds between 1984 and 1988/89 showed neither awalid nor non-award settlements had 
kept pace with inflation as measured by the CPI, largely because the ·effects of GST had not 
been compensated for (Harbridge, 1990). 
But the wage attrition caused by inflation during this period did not address the many 
other issues which arose as key employer concerns during the very difficult trading conditions 
of the late 1980s and beginning of the 1990s. For example, following the deregulation of 
shop trading hours in 1989 there was ~enottnous pressure from retail employers, confronted 
with height~ened ~competition and a depressed retail trading environment, for cuts to w·eekend 
penal rates. Y·et there was no att~empt to enforoe these demands through the use of lockouts. 
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The same observation could be made about other sectors of the economy during this period 
- among others, the hotel, transport, stores, education sectors - where employers sought major 
concessions on such issues as penal mtes, hours of work and the use of casual workers. 
The historical rarity of lockouts was noted by ~Geare (1988), who suggested: 
"Lockouts are so few in number because there is rarely any need for employers to use a 
lockout - even if they warn a stoppage of work. If they really 'Want a stoppage, then in 
practically all cases 'they can trigger a strike ~eilher by their ,actions or by their refusal to 
act." 
A ,more important reason. and one which will be explored later in this paper, li~es in 
the influence of the highly regulated and centralised system of award bargaining, which , 
captured 79% of all unionised private sector workers and 52% of unionised public sector 
employees in 1989/90 (Harbridge, 1991). The practicaliti~es of this system meant that for 
lockouts to be effective employers would have had to act in a highly organised and 
disciplined manner, but the system itself militated against this degree of cohesion.. As has 
often been ~commented, the process of award bargaining was relatively remote from most 
employers, who by and large accepted the outcome as a fait accompli. Indeed, for many 
employers the system had benefits: Harbridge (1991, supra) not~ed that the award system 
provided low wage outcomes and low transaction costs for ~employers, and McAndrew and 
Hursthouse ( 1990) found "little overt dissatisfaction with patterns of interaction between 
employers and unions., and relativ~ely little dissatisfaction with the outcomes of the existing 
system." 'Therefore, it is arguable that lockouts were rare in the pre-ECA ,environment 
because ~employers lacked the necessary motivation. 
The l991 Act: the new order 
'To test the proposition that the ECA has made the lockout a more accessible and 
effective weapon than it was under the LRA, it is necessary first to canvass the relevant 
provisions of both statutes. 
The statutory definition of lockout in s62 of the ECA is identical to the LRA 's 
definition at s232. A lockout is the act of an employer in closing, suspending, or 
discontinuing all or part of its business, or wholly or partially discontinuing the employment 
of any workers, or in breaking some or all of its contracts of service, or in refusing to engage 
workers nonnally engaged by the employer, with a vi~ew 'to compelling any workers, or to aid 
any other employer to compel workers, 'to accept terms of employment or to comply with any 
demands made by the employer. 
The circumstances in which S'trikes and lockouts are unlawful and lawful ~e laid out 
in ECA s63 and s64 respectively. Section 63 makes unlawful any strike or lockout which 
occurs while a collective employment contract (CEC) relating to the employees involv~ed is 
in force; or if it relates to a dispute or a personal grievance; or to any matter dealt with under 
Part I (freedom of association) of the ECA; or if the action concerns whether more than one 
employer will be bound by a CEC; or if the requifed notice provisions in essential services 
have not been complied with. Strikes and lockouts are lawful under the E~CA if they are not 
unlawful under s63, and if they relate to the negotiation of a CE~C for the ~employees 
concerned. 
The count~erparts to these sections under the LRA were s223 and s234. The principal 
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differences between the two statutes are that the LRA allowed strikes and lockouts over 
disputes of intefest when the relevant award or agreement had no more than 60 days until it 
expired, or if they related to a "new matter" (a concept absent from the ECA), or to the 
negotiation of a redundancy agreement. The LRA rendered unlawful strikes and lockouts 
over disputes, personal grievances, demarcation disputes, union membership or change of 
union coverage, cancellation of union registration, or where the action occurred more than 60 
days before the expiry of the relevant award or agreement, or in ~essential industries where 
the notice requirements had not been met. The ECA mirrors the LRA's provision that strikes 
and lockouts on health and safety grounds are not unlawful. 
Hence, the ECA 's lockout provisions owe much to the LRA. In practice, however, 
profound differences have emerged in te1n1s of employers' willingness and ability to use 
lockouts to effect change. The reason for this lies in the interplay between the ECA 's lockout 
provisions and its bargaining framework. 
The ECA has shifted industrial relations from a ·Corporatist model to a contractualist 
model (Chmchman, 1991). It provides for individual and collective ·contracts which bind only 
the individual employers and employees who are dir~ect parties to the contracts. Collective 
contracts remain in force as collective instruments only until their expiry dates. Unless a new 
CEC is negotiated, e.mployees are automatically deemed to be on individual employment 
contracts (IECs) which incorporate the tetrns of the expired CE·C. Union membership is 
voluntary and unions have no special status in the industrial process. Workers may select any 
bargaining agent - not necessarily a union - to ~epresent them, or they may represent 
themselves. The employer must recognise its workers' authorised bargaining agents, but the 
ECA does not compel it to negotiate with those agents. The bargaining proc·ess itself is 
non-prescriptive, and can take any course the parties choose. The E·CA is neutral as to 
whether settlements are achieved, and leaves the negotiation of employment contracts entirely 
in the hands of the panies. 
In contrast, the LRA provided for awanls to bind all workers and ~employers in the 
industry or occupation to which the document applied, and for agreements to bind all workers 
whose employers were signatories. Unions, rather than individual workers, were parties to 
awards and agreements, and unions had recognised bargaining rights on behalf of workers. 
The LRA provided for awards and agreements to remain in force as collective documents for 
up to three years beyond their expiry dates. Compulsory union membership under awards and 
agreements could be achieved either by ballot of workers or agreement with the ~employer 
negotiators, and unions had exclusive coverage rights over workers captured by their 
membership rules. The negotiation of awai!ds was highly regulated through the process of 
compulsory conciliation, whereby employer and union advocates fotrned conciliation councils 
chaired by mediators employed by the Government Mediation Service. If negotiations broke 
down, the dispute would be referred to the Arbitration Commission, which would endeavour 
to get the parties back to the bargaining table or, if requested by both parries, could arbitrate 
a settlement. 
The LRA also provided for agreements, which were achieved by voluntary negotiation 
and bound only the employers and unions who actually negotiated them. However, until the 
1990 Labour Relations Amendment Act, unions had exclusive power to cite employ~ers out 
of award coverage for negotiations for a separate agreement The amendment gave employers 
with more than 50 workers power to initiate the citing out process. In common with the 
ECA, the L.RA, up until the 1990 amendment, contained no provision for compulsory 
arbitration, although the 1990 amendment introduced compulsory final offer arbitration in 
circumstances where protracted negotiations had failed to achieve a settlement 
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The outcome of this radical change in the bargaining process has been a rapid shift 
from large, multi-employer awards to a predominance of enterprise-based contracts (Harbridge 
and Moulder, 1992). It is in the context of the ECA's decentralised, face to face mode of 
bargaining that the effective power of the lockout has been magnified. 
Lock~outs under the Employment Contracts Act 
The ftrSt case of imponance in testing this proposition is Prendergast v Associated 
Stevedores [1991] 2ERNZ (AEC20). This followed an earlier decision of the Labour Court 
(sitting as the Employment Tribunal) between the same parties, which held that the provisions 
of the employees' expired award restricting the use of casual labour by the employer fotrned 
part of their IECs under sl9(4) of the ECA. Following that decision, the employer notified 
the employees that it intended bfeaching, under s62(l)(c), the provisions of their IECs relating 
to the use of casual labour, until they agreed to a new ~CEC which eliminated the very 
provisions it intended breaching, and to which the Waterfront Workers' Union was not a 
pany. Rejecting the employees' pleas for compliance orders, interim and pe1n1anent 
injunctions, Travis J held that the employer had been using a "legitimate tool of industrial 
relations, namely the threat of a lockout", to strengthen its bargaining position. 
This case, then, established that ~employers who failed to achieve what they wanted 
through negotiations for a CEC could lawfully impose the specific changes they sought under 
the protection of s62(l)(c). This fotin of action, conveniently dubbed the "partial lockout"' 
because it amounts to something less than a lit~eral locking out of the ~employees from their 
place of work, was further developed in Paul and Ors v NZ Society for the Intellectually 
,Handicapped Inc 15/1/92 WEC 1/92 W 127/91. The IHC, faced with a financial crisis, was 
seeking two CECs covering different sections of its workforce, and wanted changes to its 
employees' tetms and conditions to achieve significant cost savings for the organisation. 
When negotiations with the ~employees' bargaining agent failed to yield agreement, IHC 
notified the employees it intended breaching those provisions of their IECs that it wanted 
eliminated from the proposed CEC. They were told the action would sav~e the IHC $4.2 
million within six months, and that it was being taken 'with a view to compelling them ~o 
accept new tetnls of employment. 
Unlike the Prendergast case, the IHC action threa~ened to have an immediate impact 
on employees' wage packets. They claimed the action was a breach of their IE~Cs and sought 
from the Employment Court a compliance oroer and injunction restraining IHC from 
committing the br:eaches. Castle J found rn~C's action was a lockout under s62(1)(c) in that 
"fundamental tettns" of the employees' ~contracts had 'been breached. The lockout related to 
the negotiation of a CEC and was therefo11e lawful under s64 (l)(b). In using the 
"fundamental terms" test of whether the employees' contracts had been breached, Castle J 
drew on the Armourguard case (supra), heard under the LRA. In that case, which concerned 
whether the employer's action in introducing a new re~scue frre appliance prior to customary 
consultative discussions with the union was a lockout, and if so whether it ·was unlawful, 
Goddard CJ said: 
If the [new flre appliance] is introduced, and 'the respondent requires the workers to operate 
il, would lhat requirement be so fundamental a breach of the contract of employment at 
present in existence between the parties as to entitle the workers ~o say "you ~cannot order 
us to do this, we are entitled to cancel the contract of employment and to treat your 
direction as a dismissal"? 
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In Armour guard, the answer to the question was "no". It was neither an ,express nor implied 
tetrn of the employees' contracts that consultation take place. In IHC, however, the 
employer's action in breaching its employees' contracts, with the effect of immediately 
reducing their earnings, was held to be such a fundamental breach that it constituted a lockout 
under s62(l)(c). The implication of the fundamental te1111 test, and its application in IHC, 
seems to be that 'the more an employer's action goes to the very heart of the 
employee/employer relationship - that is, to their wages and conditions and other matters 
embodied in the employment contract - the more likely the action will be held to be a 
lockout and therefore, provided the action is lawful, immune from compliance orders or 
• • • tnJuncuons. 
The IHC decision also underlines the absenee of any requirement under the E~CA (as 
under the LRA) to bargain in good faith. Drawing on NZ Public Service Association' v 
Annourguard Rescue Services Ltd [1989] 2 NZILR 405, Castle J held the only relevant issue 
for the Coun was whether negotiations were being held, not their quality or the bargaining 
strength of the parties. (See also Hyndman and Unkovich v Air New Zealand Ltd 16/10/91 
AEC 19/91 A250 and A251.91 at page 3). 
Taken together, P~endergast and IHC rev,eal the manner in which employers can 
lawfully thrust change on employees when negotiations have failed to produce the desired 
settlement. Thus the decisions ~create an irreconcilable conflict with the ECA's fundamental 
premise of sanctity of contract, and with earlier decisions upholding that principle (for 
instance, Resident Doctors' Assn v Otago Area Health Board [1991] 2ERNZ (CL~C 41), and 
Grant v Superstrike Bowling Cent~es Ltd ALC 81/91). The ability to use s62(1)(c) to target 
unwanted provisions in contracts has directly undernlined s19(4) of the ECA, which provides 
that when a CEC expires employees are deemed to be on IECs based on the tetn1s of the 
expired CEC. In the light of IHC and Prendergast, s19(4) need not impede a determined 
employer from imposing its will on employees. It is ironic to note that some cases 
concerning breaches of sl9(4) (for example, United Food and C.hemical Workers' Union v 
Talleys Fisheries Ltd unreponed, 9 August 1991 WLC 73/91) may have produced different 
r~esults had the employer sought the protection of s62(1)(c). 
Further, the ability of employers to follow the example of IHC and, in effect, impose 
new tenus on employees, undetmines the very object of Part IV of the ECA, which 
establishes that employment contracts create enforc·eable rights and obligations and that the 
primary remedy for any breach of contract is a compliance order. Provided an employer can 
establish it has acted lawfully under s62(l)(c), workers can expect no relief from the ~Court. 
Significantly, Castle J in /H~C rejected the view of his ,colleague Colgan J in Air New 
Zealand (supra). Colgan J found that the definition of lockout at s232(l)(c) of the LRA 
contemplated compliance with a demand that was independent of the events which constituted 
the breach of the contract of employment. In Air New Zealand it was held the demand and 
the breach were one and the same thing - that pilots be clean-shaven. 
This interpretation has been aptly described as "involving a gloss to the plain words 
of the s62 definition of lockout" (Toogood, 1992). Section 62(1 )(c) contemplates the act of 
the employer in " ... breaking some ·or all of the employer's employment contracts ... with a 
view to compelling any ~employees ... to accept tetnts of employment or comply with any 
demands made by the employer". There seems no suggestion from a plain r,eading of s62 that 
the action of the employers in IHC and Prendergast in breaking the employment contracts 
in a manner that corr~esponded precisely with the demands they were making of the employees 
did not fall within the ambit of the section. Obviously, however, had Colgan J's analysis in 
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Air New Zealand been correct, the climate for employers wanting to unilaterally impose 
changes on workers would have been ~considerably more hostile than it now is as a result of 
IHC and Prendergast. 
In IHC Castle J pointed to the need only to illustrate that negotiations for a CEC were 
being conducted be£oiie a lockout could be lawful under s64(1)(b), and held that the 
bargaining s~ength of the parties and quality of the negotiations were i:nelevant to the Coun. 
In fact, in the subsequent D,esignpower case (supra)., e¥en this meagre requirement appears 
to have been abandoned by the Court. In this case Designpower employees, aware the 
company wanted to feduce their redundancy entitlement prior to laying off part of its 
workforce, refused to negotiate for a ~CEC and told the company they wanted IECs. 'The 
company threatened to lock them out with a view to ~compelling them to negotiate a CEC. 
The employees' agent, the PSA, alleged the lockout was unlawful because it did not relate , 
to the negotiation of a CEC, and because it offended against s63( l)(d), which prohibits strikes 
and lockouts relating to the ECA' s freedom of association provisions. Colgan J held that the 
lockout was law~ul even though negotiations for a CEC were not underway. The action 
related to the negotiation of a CEC, in the sense that the company wanted to ~compel its 
employees to negotiate with it for such a contract. It was held that Parliament had not 
intended s64( 1 )(b) to be Iiestricted to circumstances where negotiations had actually 
commenced. 
The PSA's allegation that the lockout threat ofiended against s5 of the E~CA (which 
establishes the right of employees to choose whether to associate f:or the purposes of 
advancing their collective employment interests, and that no undue influence can be brought 
to bear on any person by reason of that person's association or lack of association with other 
employees) also failed. Colgan J held that s5., as an objects section, did not confer 
substantive rights. 
It has been suggested that this decision will put employees in a strong position when 
dealing with employers who refuse to negotiate for a CEC. That may be so. But the impact 
of the decision is nevertheless to tip the balance of bargaining power clearly in favour of 
employers. Designpower sanctions the use of lockouts to coerce employees to associate with 
one another to negotiate a CEC. Employees, however, are specifically denied the 
corresponding power by s63(e) of the ECA, which makes it unlawful for employees to strike 
with a view to compelling employers to associate together for the purpose of negotiating a 
CEC. 
The idea of the lockout as the "minor image and quid pro quo" of the strike is further 
undetnrined by the ~Court's ruling in Hawtin v Skellerup Industrial Ltd ~CEC 28/92 C 8/92 
16/6/92. In that case the company issued lockout notices to two workers to ~compel them to 
agree to a CEC. After one of the workers agreed to sign the contract the company proceeded 
to lock out the sole remaining dissident. Palmer J held that the legislation allowed the 
lockout of a single worker, even though the definition of lockout at s62 ~efetted to ~employees 
in the plural. It was held that there was ''no conceptual problem, either in logic or in law" 
presented by a lockout of one work~er who refused to si,gn a CEC which., by definition, must 
bind two or more employee parties. It did not logically follow that, because a common 
understanding, agfeement or concened action by employees 'Was a prerequisite to a strike, 
a lockout in a corresponding opposite way must extend to two ~employees. While strikes and 
lockouts were opposites, they had distinctly different constituents which were not simply the 
reverse of the differing ~elements of ~each. 
At first glance the E~CA may hav,e appeared to con~er some protection against coeocive 
lockout action under s57, which provides remedies against contracts procured by harsh and 
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oppressive behaviour, undue influence or duress. However, Adams and O~s v Alliance 
Textiles (NZ) Ltd [1991] 2 ERNZ (CEC 22) effectively dispels this possibility. In this case 
it was argued employees were coerced into agreeing to new contracts by the employer's 
imposition of a lockout, and that this amounted to economic duress. Goddard CJ held that 
the lockout in question was lawful and did not amount to duress. The ~Chief Judge's analysis 
of the law on whether, in the industrial relations cont~ext, a lawful act can constitute ~economic 
dmess leaves little scope for ~employees to seek the shelter of s57 in the event of a lawful 
lockout. It was noted that the E~CA did not grant immunity for lawful strikes and lockouts 
from proceedings under s57, as it did from proceedings in tort (s73) and from applications 
for injunction (s74), and that an allegation of duress arising from a lockout which may be 
lawful could not be dismissed out of hand by the ~Court and must be treated seriously. But 
the Court would necessarily approach such a suggestion with caution, the main reason being 
that Parliament had liecognised the legitimacy of strikes and lockouts in certain circumstances. 
To recognise lockouts as amounting to economic duress would carry the same consequence 
for strikes. Therefore, "there would need to be a most exceptional set of circumstances to 
justify [such a finding]". In holding that the facts of the Alliance case did not warrant such 
a finding, Goddard CJ gave a clear indication of the difficulty employees would face in 
seeking the protection of s57 in lawful lockout situations: 
It may have been otherwise (I put it no more strongly than that) if there had been a 
prolonged lockout. finally bringing employees to their knees by virtually starving them into 
submission to the employer's demands ... 
The power of the lockout: is the ECA responsible? 
It has been argued that the rnc style of lockout could have occurred under the LRA 
and is not the result of the ECA (Birch, 1992). The crux of this argument is that the 
definition of lockout is the same under the ECA as it was under the LRA. Banks (1992), 
however, argues that while IHC-style lockouts could in theory have occurred under the LRA, 
in practice they were most unlikely given the LRA' s provision for awards and agreements 
to continue in force for up to three years beyond their expiry dates (s171) and the provision 
for awards and agreements to prevail over contracts of service in cases of conflict (sl74). 
Banks' proposition calls for further development The fact that an aw~d or agreement 
could continue in force for up to three years beyond its expiry date did not preclude lawful 
strikes or lockouts ov~er disputes of intel'est during that time. Hughes ( 1989) notes that the 
right to strike or lockout did not cease when the document expired. It was not unknown 
under the LRA for a dispute of interest to remain live for a protracted period after the 
document's expiry date, and therefore for the opportunity to take lawful strike or lockout 
action to remain open. 
The reason IHC-style tactics were unknown under the LRA lies in the nature of 
bargaining under that regime, and in particular the nature of award bargainiflg. Technically 
an employer under the LRA could, in the context of a dispute of interest where the document 
in question had less than 60 days to run, have imposed a partial lockout under s232(1)(c). 
However the reality of awtlfd bargaining, whereby nominated employer and union 
fepr~esentatives were authorised to reach settlements which in many cases bound thousands 
of employers across entire industries, was that industrial action by an individual employer 
• 
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would have been ineffective. 
Take a practical example. ABC Welding is ~covered by the metal trades award. That 
award is due to ~expire in 60 days and the Engineers' Union has created a dispute of interest 
to initiate negotiations for its renewal. For its pan, ABC wants to lower its base pay rate by 
1% and imposes such a cut under the auspices of s232(1)(c). ABC's employer representatives 
then settle the award with the union on the basis of a 2% increase in the base pay rate. By 
vinue of the award's subsequent parties pfovision, ABC is bound by the new document, and 
because the dispute is settled the lockout is no longer lawful. The end result is that ABC has 
achieved nothing more than a temporary lowering of its wage bill, has brought no influence 
to bear on the award negotiations, and has probably seriously marred its relationship with its 
employees . 
The only circumstance in which ABC's action may have been effective would have 
been if it was part of a concerted and widespread campaign by other employers bound by the 
same award. And even then, the ability of all workers ~covered by the award to mount 
retaliatory strike action would most likely have been enough to deter employers from taking 
such unilateral action. However it is ·Conceivable that the partial lockout could have been 
us·ed to effect under the LRA in the con~ext of cited party agreements, particularly enterprise 
deals where the ~employer taking the lockout action would also have been an original party 
to any final settlement. 
The Hawtin case, too, would have been practically, if not theoretically, impossible 
under the LRA. Under that Iiegime unions, rather than individual workers, were parties to 
awards and agiieements. In principle a single employee (assuming the Labour Coun adopted 
the same approach as Palmer J in Haw.tin) could have been locked out in the context of a 
dispute of interest, but the collective nature of bargaining, whereby the focus was on the 
union rather than the individual wor~er, meant such action would have been fruitless (if not 
completely counter-productive) for the employer. Also, once the document in dispute was 
settled it would have been impossible for an individual Ylorker to hold out against it, so the 
prospect of a lawful lockout of a single employee could not have arisen. 
There is another aspect to the bargaining environment created by the ECA that 
supports the proposition that lockouts are a more readily available and powerful tool now than 
they were under the LRA. The LRA, prior to the introduction of the 1990 amendment, 
imposed no requirement on the parties to negotiate in good faith. This was noted in 
A1mo.urguard (supra) in a passage adopted by Castle J in the IHC ruling to illustrate that this 
pe1u1issive approach still applies under the ECA: 
... there is no C{)mpulsory arbitration, there is no sanction against a pany which refuses to 
negotiate, and it is because of these considerations that workers have been ,given a limited 
right to strike as the only means available to compel employers to negotiate. 
But in Hyndman (supra), Colgan J suggested the ECA had gone further than the LRA 
in this respect, by removing any "legitimate expectation" that the employer would continue 
to negotiate with its employees: 
Although under the plievious industrial regime employees may have expected a degree of 
continued negotiations. under the new negotiation can include the option of declining or 
.refusing to negotiate or at least of coming by a process of negotiation to a fmal offer 
position in default of acceptance of which olller lawful options may be resorted to. 
The basis of such a "legitimate expectation" under the LRA was not discussed in the 
328 Rebecca Macfie 
ruling, but it is arguable that such an expectation ste·mmed from sections (b) and (c) of the 
Act's long title, namely "to provide procedures for the ofderly conduct of relations between 
workers and employers" and ''to provide a framework to enable agreements to be reached 
between workers and employers". The whole thrust of the fotmal structure of award 
bargaining through the compulsory conciliation process an<L in the latter stages of the LRA, 
the availability of limited compulsory final offer arbitration, was to facilitate settlements 
between unions and employers. Although voluntary agreements were settled outside the 
compulsory conciliation process, the Mediation Service and Arbitration Commission were 
nevertheless available to the parties to assist in achieving settlements. 
In addition, the LRA contained a range of special powers in relation to strikes and 
lockouts. Section 244 granted the chief mediator pow~er to inquire into disputes in essential 
industries where the public interest was affected or threatened by an existing or tiueatened 
strike or lockout, and to attempt to settle the dispute. Section 245 gave the Ministet of 
Labour power in such circumstances to ask a mediator to inquire into the dispute, following 
which, under s246, the Labour Court could be called on to settle the disput~e or to set out how 
it should be settled. Under s247 the Minister could call a conference of the parties, and if 
they failed to attend, the con~erence chaitn1an could make a final and binding settlement. 
Section 248 allow,ed the Minister to appoint a committee of inquiry into a dispute, and finally, 
s249 allowed a mediator to call a conference to try and settle a dispute. 
With the exception of s249, these provisions wefe rarely used, but in co,mbination 
·with the bargaining process, were indicative of an industrial relations culture in which there 
prevailed an expectation of negotiation. The ECA, by contrast, has established a minimalist 
bargaining regime from which the Mediation Service and Arbitration Commission have been 
abolished, and which contains none of the special provisions in relation to strikes and lockouts 
listed above. As has been noted, the ECA is entirely neutral as to whether settlements are 
achieved and imposes neither an expectation nor an obligation on the parties to ~employment 
contracts to negotiate. 
There is one final and highly significant featme of the ECA which has contributed to 
the emergence of the lockout as a more powerful tool than it was under the LRA. Under the 
LRA an employer imposing a lockout, particularly under s232(1)(a), (b) and (d), could 
conceivably have en1ployed alternative labour to replace the locked out employees. But 
provided an award or agreement was in force the employer would have had to engage those 
workers under the tettns of the same document that applied to the locked out wor}cjers. In 
other words, there would have been no immediate financial advantage to the employer in 
doing so. Also, as was likely, if the relevant award or agreement contained a compulsory 
union membership clause the replacement workers would have had to become members of 
the very union which was opposing the ~employer's demands. That union would have had 
exclusive bargaining rights ov,er the replacement workers., as well as over any petinanent 
workers who chose to r~eturn to work on the employer's tettns. The system petntitted little 
practical possibility of alternative representation to unde11nine the standing of the union 'With 
coverage of the site. 
The ECA has changed all that Because employment contracts bind only the direct 
parties, employers can replace locked out (or striking) workers with cheaper labour, which, 
at the very least~ reduces the financial cost of n1ounting a campaign of industrial action. 
Unionism is now voluntary, so replacement workers need not feel the disciplinary wrath of 
their union officials for "scabbing" on their feHow workers. Indeed, under the ECA it is open 
to them to set up a rival "employee organisation 11 to challenge the status of the union with 
traditional coverage of the site . 
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A graphic example of these points was the Christchurch Carpet Yarns dispute in early 
1992. In that dispute, about half the workforce re£used to agree to the employer's demands 
for a new CEC, and were locked out The remainder of the workforce signed the new CEC 
and returned to work, and replacement employees were recruited on the tenns of the new 
CEC to ftll in for the locked out workers. A new employee organisation was foi1ned during 
the lockout to represent those who were working under the new CE~C. Thus the company was 
able to minimise the cost of the dispute, which ended when the locked out workers agreed 
to return to work on the employer's tettns. 
C I . ODC _USIOD 
The sum total of these changes to the bargaining process is that employers, particularly 
in an economic climate of high unemployment which gives them 'the upper hand, can 
effectively exchange sincere negotiation with force by imposing ~changes on workers through 
lockouts, provided they can demonstrate they are acting lawfully within the meaning of s64. 
The Minister of Labour and his officials (Department of Labour, 1992) have argued, 
in liesponse to alann at the implications of the IHC decision, that the law is neutral between 
strikes and lockouts. This comment defies the Iieality of the ~employment relationship. It is 
true that workers may breach sections of their contracts by way of strike action, just as the 
IHC breached parts of its contracts. But in practice the impact of the two fottns of action can 
never be "neutral". There is simply no circumstance in which ~employees could make a 
demand of an employer and then impose the desired ~change by way of strike action without 
themselves incurring financial loss. Only the ~employer is in the position of being able to 
make a demand and then, by exercising its control of the business, impose the change 
through industrial action. An employer can demand and then impose a pay cut; employees 
can demand a pay rise but cannot impose it Even if, for instance, employees were to demand 
a shoner working week and then impose it by not turning up on the hours they wanted to be 
relieved of, they would suffer immediate financial loss because the ~employer would not be 
obliged to pay them for those hours. 
The body of case law that has developed since the E~CA was introduced has ~effectively 
closed off the avenues for workers to ~esist employer demands, and undetrnined their 
purported rights under the E~CA. In particular, it has made a mockery of the Minister of 
Labour's assurances that employees' contracts could not be unilaterally changed by 
employers. As IHC and Prendergast hav,e shown, employers can do just that, pfovided they 
select the cin:umstances in which they act to ensure the legality of the move. 
The Minister of Labour has defended the ECA and the recent case law on lockouts 
with the comment that "employers regard lockouts as an action to be taken only in the last 
tesort ... lockouts, including partial lockouts, hav~e the pot~ential to seriously damage 
employee/employer relationships" (Birch, 1992), and that strikes or lockouts are generally 
taken by one party or the other as a shon tet ,rn measure. 'These comments are based on the 
expectation of reasonable industrial relations behaviour, which allows the Minister to evade 
the reality that the new regime has opened up eno1n1ous po1ential for employers to lawfully 
force their will on their ~employees. What needs to be addressed is not how the parties in 
industrial relations ought to behave, but the scope for unreasonable and unfair behaviour that 
the legislation tolerates. 
In this respect, it is suggested the following changes would go some way to restoring 
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the balance to the employee/employer lielationship without threatening the philosophical 
integrity of the ECA: 
- a requirement or expectation that employers and employees negotiate in good faith, 
thereby reducing the potential that now exists for employers to simply state their 
demands and then peremptorily enfofce them through lockout action. 
- a prohibition on employers making a demand of employees, and then enforcing that 
demand tmough lockout action under s62(l)(c). This suggestion takes its lead from 
the ruling of Castle J in Air New Zealand (supra) which was subsequently rejected in 
the IHC case. This would significantly curtail the potential for employers to adopt the 
tactics in IHC and Prendergast and effectively unilaterally vary their employees' tetnls 
and conditions, and would therefore resto.,e credibility to the Minister of Labour's 
assurances that such unilateral variations could not occur under the ECA. 
- the repeal of s63(e), which prevents employees from striking over the issue of whether 
a CEC will bind more than one ,employer. The Designpower case sanctions the use 
of lockouts to force employees to associate with one another for the purpose of 
negotiating a CEC, yet employees are specifically deprived of the corr~esponding right 
to strike to force employers to associate together for a CEC. Repeal of s63(e) would 
redress this imbalance. 
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